Jonathan White's In the long run: the future as a political idea It examines how changing political conceptions of the future have affected democracy, arguing that contemporary challenges such as the economic slowdown and climate change have led to reactive and short-term politics. Although the book suggests ways to revitalize democracy, it… Avik Bhattacharya This suggests that we may need to look outside our political institutions for strategies to build a more open future.
You can read an interview with Jonathan White about the book here. On Monday 11 March, at 6.30pm, White will speak at an LSE panel event, Politics of the Future – find details and register here.
In the long run: the future as a political idea. Jonathan White. Profile Books. 2024.
In the long run: the future as a political idea It is a book about the history of the future, and what it means for the present. More precisely, it describes how the way people think about the future has evolved over time, and the impact of these changes on democracy. Jonathan White's basic argument is that while optimism about the future once helped build democracy, economic slowdown, climate change, new technology and geopolitical tensions mean that “the future no longer looks like its own future.” [democracy’s] friend”.
For democracy to work, White notes, it is crucial that people believe that an “open future” is possible: that there are alternatives to the status quo, that society can develop in a range of different ways, and that people can choose among them. . One of the main defining characteristics of democracy – the peaceful handover of power – is based on the changeability of the future: losers in elections believe that they will have the opportunity to realize their vision of society again.
White notes that for democracy to work, it is crucial that people believe that an “open future” is possible
Nowadays, it's difficult to maintain that patience and faith, White says. The future is viewed with fear and claustrophobia. At various points, he describes the future, far from being open, as “closed.” Catastrophe—societal disintegration, conflict, ecological collapse—seems difficult to avoid. To the extent that there are options, they involve acquiescence to technocrats. There is a “now or never” urgency when it comes to politics, and the fear that waiting your turn means leaving it too late because the other side will ruin everything.
Through a tour of historical political thinkers, White charts the ideas of the future that make for a more vibrant democratic system. Political and social outcomes must appear open, but not in a way that is so destabilizing that it leads to counter-revolution on the part of those attached to the present. A strand of utopia may be energizing, but it must be linked to near-term political tactics to be workable. Efforts to reduce uncertainty, and make the future predictable, through calculation and technocracy, threaten to weaken the imagination and mass participation necessary for a vibrant democracy. At the same time, anarchic impulsiveness and complete disregard for experience threaten to descend into fascism. Trying to control the future by keeping it a secret is likely to generate conspiracy theories and discontent. Consumerism is individualizing the future and means we no longer participate in it – we move from valuing Victorian steam trains to desiring our own personal cars.
Our perpetual state of emergency, although it creates unpredictability, also produces reactive policies, designed essentially to restore things to the way they were.
The vision of the future we have reached today is not, in White's opinion, sufficiently conducive to democracy. Our perpetual state of emergency, although it creates unpredictability, also produces reactive policies, designed essentially to restore things to the way they were. The short-term orientation dominates – especially through the electoral cycle, but even longer-term threats such as climate change can only be dealt with by turning them into benchmarks and deadlines. Governance and secrecy prevail, empowering organizations like the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund and sparking reckless populist responses.
White's proposals to rebuild a more positive perception of the future and revitalize democracy are somewhat surprising. He is skeptical of direct democracy – while more referendums may give ordinary citizens a greater chance to shape the future, they raise the stakes and perpetuate an “all-or-nothing” policy that he believes is so unfortunate. Small councils are too small to bring about tangible change, and citizens' assemblies are too short to pursue a consistent vision.
White calls for a “radical representative democracy,” with collective participation in the development of party policy and the opportunity for party members to call out politicians who fail to achieve those agreed goals.
Instead, he places his cards on political parties as the crucible for a more comprehensive, convincing, and hopeful vision for the future. It calls for a “radical representative democracy”, with collective participation in developing party policy and the opportunity for party members to call out politicians who fail to achieve those agreed-upon goals. It is an argument that has echoes of Peter Mayer's argument The rule of emptinessWhich also claimed that the separation of ordinary members and politicians from their political parties led to the “hollowing out of Western democracy.”
White's rebooted party system sounds good in theory, but it calls into question its practical viability. Its central assumption is that the disempowerment of citizens is the root of today's democratic malaise, and that the opportunity to gain greater influence will be enough to tempt enough people to give up their evenings and weekends in favor of political causes. It is not encouraging that established parties that have done their best to engage with mass movements and improve participation in things like online platforms – Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy – do not appear to have succeeded in restoring democratic confidence in their countries.
The Victorian capitalists who built factories and railways may not have been personally attractive, but they inspired progressives and socialists to dream of how their innovations could be used for the benefit of all.
White is curiously dismissive of pockets of optimism that exist outside the political system – most notably Silicon Valley, where ideas like “efficient acceleration,” the view that technological progress is likely to avert many of the deep societal challenges we face, have taken hold. For White, they display the wrong kind of optimism: too consumerist and individualistic, too inclined toward anarchist, anti-system thinking, tendencies epitomized by the character of Elon Musk, who is presented as fascist, if not fascist. Regardless of whether this is a fair description of Musk, the question it raises is why trust in tech companies seems so disconnected from the sentiments of broader society. The Victorian capitalists who built factories and railways may not have been personally attractive, but they inspired progressives and socialists to dream of how their innovations could be used for the benefit of all. There are some figures – such as Aaron Bastani on the far left and Derek Thompson on the center left – who are trying to do something similar today, but White does not recognize them as such.
White assumes that problems of democracy are internal: they are caused by political institutions and must be solved by these institutions.
Most importantly, White assumes that democracy's problems are endogenous: they are caused by political institutions and must be solved by these institutions. But there are clearer interpretations of modern ethics. It is natural to expect that stagnant economic growth, and the failure of new technologies to significantly improve living standards, will undermine confidence that things will improve. The demographic shift towards older populations in rich countries may also have contributed to a lack of vitality and enthusiasm, and a tendency to look back with nostalgia rather than to the future with hope. Even among young people, we should not necessarily take perceptions at face value. Phenomena such as “climate anxiety” appear to reflect anxiety at least as much as climate, and as such are often psychological, rather than merely political, in nature.
This is not necessarily a comforting thought. Maybe a technological bonanza is just around the corner, maybe the economy will turn around, maybe the mental health crisis will abate – whether through sheer luck or unusually effective action – and people will start to feel better about the future. but at the long term He points out that fixing the problems of democracy, and renewing our faith in an open future, is a much greater task than modifying its institutions.
