He warned that here in the Mojave Desert, where Taylor oversees a war simulation designed to prepare American forces for real war, the same behavior abounds.
Taylor picked up his cell phone. He said: “This device will cause the death of our soldiers.”
The US military is undertaking an extensive review of its approach to war fighting, having largely abandoned the counterinsurgency rules that were the hallmark of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to focus instead on preparing for a larger conflict with more sophisticated adversaries such as Russia or China. .
What happened in Ukraine, where the war this week enters its third year with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded on both sides and still no end in sight, made clear to the Pentagon that the battlefield calculus has changed radically in the years since it was last deployed. Troops in large numbers. Precision weapons, drone fleets, and digital surveillance can reach far beyond the front lines, posing serious danger to individuals wherever they are.
Officials say the war remains an active and abundant research opportunity for American military planners as they look to the future. A secret, yearlong study on lessons learned from both sides of the bloody campaign will help inform the upcoming National Defense Strategy, a comprehensive document that outlines the Pentagon's myriad priorities. The 20 officers who led the project examined five areas: ground maneuver, air power, information warfare, force sustainment and development, and long-range fire capability.
“We have brought them into this conflict to make sure they really understand the implications of war,” said a senior Defense Department official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the initiative.
Another official said the “character of the war” was changing, and lessons learned from Ukraine would be a “permanent resource.”
The Ukrainian conflict has challenged basic assumptions. The war has become a battle of attrition with each side trying to wear the other down, a model believed to be outdated, said Stacey Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank.
It also complicated the Pentagon's belief that expensive precision weapons were key to winning American conflicts, Pettyjohn said. GPS-guided munitions supplied to Ukraine have proven vulnerable to electronic jamming. Its military has adapted by linking older, unguided artillery with sensors and drones, which can be used to identify targets and improve its shots. She said it was almost certain that US military leaders had taken notice.
“The new cigarette in the ditch”
Officials say Ukraine has proven that everything U.S. forces do in the field — from mission planning and patrolling to the technology that enables them to carry out nearly every military mission — needs to be reconsidered.
Fort Irwin is home to the National Training Center, or NTC, one of two U.S. Army ranges where troops hone tactics and prepare for deployments. The training area, known to soldiers as “The Box,” is a swath of desert about the size of Rhode Island.
In past years, the facility has replicated what U.S. forces can expect to encounter in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now trench lines zigzag across positions meant to replicate the battlefield in Ukraine.
During the winter, the 1st Armored Division occupied the facility. As soldiers fought simulated battles, Taylor, the commanding general here, explained the transformative imprint Ukraine has had on how the military thinks and trains for combat. One of his briefing slides noted that “Russian artillery made maneuvering difficult and command positions unviable.”
More importantly, leaders repeatedly warn that most electronic equipment is a potential target. Soldiers are asked not to use their phones in the training area, and observers, known as OCs, carry hand-held detectors that try to sniff out any contraband.
Taylor told the story of an Apache helicopter pilot who successfully evaded air defense systems while simulating an attack. Individuals photographing enemy forces were unable to determine the path the helicopter took, but after examining commercially available mobile phone data, they were able to map the journey of a device traveling across the desert at 120 miles per hour. It revealed where the Apaches flew to evade defenses.
The general is determined to eliminate such behaviour. It is similar to the threat posed by smoking cigarettes on the front lines during World War II, when enemy troops looked for bright orange flashes to help identify their targets.
“I think our addiction to cell phones is just as threatening,” Taylor said. “This is the new cigarette in the ditch.”
Troops must also take into account the cell phone use occurring around them. Personnel assigned to photograph noncombatants take photos and videos of troop positions and equipment, and upload the photos to a fake social network called Fakebook. There, it is published in a feed used by service members playing enemy forces who use that data to attack.
The radios and controllers of drones and vehicles produce large amounts of detectable electromagnetic activity and thermal energy. To confuse enemy surveillance, the military teaches soldiers how to hide in plain sight.
Commanders said troops are learning. But walking around The Box showed room for improvement. The squad's command post, a folding table with four Humvees parked around it, was covered in camouflage netting that helped mitigate electronic and thermal signatures. The post was well hidden – except for the bright white Starlink satellite internet terminal placed outside.
A soldier explained that the network interfered with its signal. Taylor told them it was risky getting in front of drones or surveillance planes. “Put a blanket on it.” He advised.
The Russian and Ukrainian militaries flood the skies with unidirectional attack drones, which are inexpensive and able to evade detection. Their prolific use has forced American military leaders to reflect on where their capabilities lie.
While recent U.S. conflicts have featured large, expensive drones used for missions coordinated at very high levels of command, leaders in Ukraine have put powerful surveillance and strike capabilities in the hands of individual soldiers — a degree of autonomy for small units that the U.S. military has only recently enjoyed. Trying to imitate.
The spread of this technology has also created a new urgency at the Pentagon to develop and deploy better counter-drone systems. In Jordan last month, three American soldiers were killed after a one-way drone, which officials said was likely undetected, crashed into their living quarters.
Taking advantage of the Ukraine war, the military began experimenting with dropping small munitions from drones, a tactic used by ISIS that has since become a mainstay in Ukraine. It also made the decision to phase out its two unmanned surveillance platforms, Shadow and Raven, describing them as unsurvivable in modern conflict.
“We are learning from the battlefield — especially in Ukraine — that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said.
Gen. James B. Hecker, chief of Air Forces operations in Europe and Africa, said during a recent symposium that the Ukrainians have discovered some innovative solutions for detecting drones.
He told the story of two Ukrainians who collected thousands of smartphones, installed microphones and connected them to a network capable of detecting the unique sound generated by approaching unmanned systems. The information is then transmitted to air defense soldiers who can take necessary action. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has been briefed on these efforts and has been referred to NATO and US orders for possible replication, Hecker said.
Hecker also described recent drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and military ships in the Red Sea. The violence committed by militants in Yemen was met with an aggressive response by the United States. Referring to his counterpart responsible for defending against potential threats from China, he said, “What the Houthis did and what Russia is doing are not compared to what we will see in the theater of your actions.”
In the woods of Fort Johnson, an Army post in western Louisiana, American forces, inspired by lessons learned from Ukraine, raised a slogan: Dig or Die.
Soldiers who rotate through the Joint Readiness Training Center there learn how to create trenches and bunkers, remnants of past conflicts that have been restored to provide protection from bombs and drones. At one site, soldiers gathered handfuls of sticks and brush to better conceal trenches, saying they had shovels on the ground for hours in preparation.
“I hope they come,” said one of them. “I didn't dig this for no reason.”
Personnel Playing the role of opposing forces, they used artificial intelligence programs and cheap drones to unbalance their citizens, then showed them what they discovered to help them improve.
Although troops are getting better at physical camouflage, their digital footprint is still a weakness. An officer noted that one of the drones used by opposing forces at Fort Johnson is capable of detecting WiFi signals and Bluetooth-enabled devices.
In another case, a command center was identified by the name of its network: “Command Center.”
While the Ukraine war has prompted innovation on the battlefield, some observers believe the Pentagon will only move so quickly without troops in an extreme situation.
There is plenty of evidence that the legacy of the post-9/11 wars, which shaped the careers and experience of today's military leaders, still looms large. American forces remain under threat in the Middle East, and troops there are still allocated — and under attack — at the same bases their predecessors occupied years ago.
At Fort Johnson, the new Soldier Processing Center has three digital clocks on the wall. One displays the local clock. The others spend time in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Pettyjohn, of the Center for a New American Security, acknowledged that the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries operate differently, meaning some lessons learned from the war with Russia may not be applicable.
But she noted that some US military leaders she spoke to seemed wary that there was a lot to learn. She said they underestimate how much the nature of the fighting has changed, and cling to the dangerous assumption that the United States will simply do what is best in similar circumstances.
