If anyone is lost about what the future holds for the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, don't feel bad.
The constant threats, varied verbiage, and sheer number of attacks back and forth are extremely difficult to understand.
However, after several recent visits to the North, briefings with senior officials, discussions with rank-and-file soldiers, and verification of other key sources, Jerusalem Post Major developments can be “translated” and separated from less important developments.
Neither side is interested in general war
First of all, despite increasing threats from both Israel and Hezbollah, neither side actually wants to open a much larger general war any time soon.
This seems counterintuitive after days in which several senior Israeli officials said that Israel and Hezbollah were closer to conflict than ever before, and in which Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah brandished his sword louder in every speech.
But if you compare Israel's statements and Hezbollah's statements a few weeks ago, you will not find them that different.
Most are a smokescreen for each side to try to get the upper hand in the competition over who is seen as the winner so far and who will be able to declare victory when the conflict is over.
Actions speak louder than words
However, there are some actions and facts that matter much more than words.
In the last month or so, and even more so in recent weeks, the IDF has attacked approximately 15 villages that Hezbollah was using as cover fire into northern Israel.
During the middle of last week, the Israeli army significantly increased the level of its attack when it opened fire on Hezbollah fighters and its positions in the village of Wadi al-Saluki dozens of times within hours.
Until then, the IDF had been launching much smaller-scale attacks on villages, and this was after months when the IDF had not bombed villages at all, and was only prepared to attack Hezbollah missile crews in open areas.
This shift has hurt Hezbollah, recalibrating its calculations about how it will try to prolong its fire on Israel, and is far more important than any words.
The result was that about a month ago, the IDF pushed about 50% of Hezbollah's 6,000 soldiers back from the border with Israel, and this percentage is now approaching 75%. Jerusalem Post to learn.
the post He also recognizes that the IDF was more successful in destroying Hezbollah watchtowers on the border, destroying or damaging between 80-95% depending on what one considers damaged versus destroyed.
In addition to this wide range of military operations that change the playing field, the Israeli army admitted to the assassination of Hezbollah drone commander Ali Hussein Bergi, and the terrorist group accused Al-Quds of killing Hezbollah leader Radwan Wissam Al-Tawil.
These matters did not change the playing field on the ground much, but they were a direct blow to Nasrallah's confidence because they made it clearer than any words that the IDF was and remains willing to take down the gloves even against senior Hezbollah officials if the terrorist group rises. It crosses certain lines.
War with Hezbollah is unlikely in the foreseeable future
Why, then, is a general war unlikely in the near future?
From Nasrallah's point of view, he does not need a bigger war to declare victory.
He succeeded in convincing some 80,000 Israelis to evacuate the north and demonstrated that he is capable of continuing to fire on Israel for more than 100 days and counting, by firing fewer than 3,000 times – that is, without making any impact on his arsenal of 150,000 rockets and mortars. .
All he has to do is try not to lose face too much or give in too much before the new ceasefire begins.
While he views the world differently from Westerners, he would certainly prefer that Beirut and Lebanon not look like the badly devastated Gaza Strip.
Israel and the IDF leadership, for their part, are deeply divided over what to do with Hezbollah.
All major political and defense officials support trying to reach a diplomatic agreement under which Hezbollah withdraws 100% of its Radwan forces from the border with Israel if possible, with war only being considered a second option.
But some in the IDF believe an ultimatum and deadline should be given to Hezbollah sooner rather than later.
Some senior IDF officials who—before the war might have been more strongly inclined to want to attack Hezbollah sooner with a preemptive strike to start what they saw as an inevitable conflict on Israeli terms—may now feel, counterintuitively, more impatient to wait for a later date. .
If some IDF officials view Hezbollah's actions in inserting itself into the war between Israel and Hamas, and evacuating residents of the north for more than 100 days, as an insult that must be corrected immediately, others believe that Israel's actions in the past month or so have changed the picture. . .
After repelling such a large number of Hezbollah forces, they feel that the chance of Hezbollah launching an attack is the lowest in years, and that this also provides more time for the IDF to delay a preemptive strike to a more opportune moment in the war. the far future.
Others, however, are terrified about what Hezbollah might do to Israel's home front if it released its full arsenal, even though Israel would undoubtedly “win” such a conflict in terms of killing and destroying more Hezbollah forces and infrastructure in absolute terms.
Simply put, they view Israel as less able to withstand losses on the home front than the Lebanese terrorist group.
Weather is also important, and finding a major war in the middle of winter could harm Israel's ability to exploit its high-quality military capabilities.
Finally, some do not want to start a major battle with Hezbollah before Khan Yunis is subdued, or after a few months, or even later than Gaza itself is stable and away from the immediate danger of Hamas returning to take over.
Israeli actions have set Hezbollah back significantly, but were also designed to be clearly limited from upsetting Hezbollah beyond a certain point.
It is still possible that a general war could break out tomorrow if one side miscalculates and pushes the other too far.
But in the meantime, readers will get a more accurate picture by observing the actions of both sides, both what they do and what they do not do, compared to the warlike rhetoric that keeps repeating itself.
