China's political and economic rise has prompted the European Union, the United States and other powers to change their approach to developing international standards in key technology areas. This is an area largely dominated by the West – but one in which China has become more strategic and aggressive in recent years, and where it now has greater influence.
Standards development has long been the preserve of private sector actors and technical experts. But in light of accelerating geopolitical competition between great powers, Western countries have turned toward greater state intervention in standards development: for example, the European Union and the United States agreed on the Strategic Standards Information Mechanism to exchange information and jointly respond to what they agree on. “Common strategic issues” (read: China). Meanwhile, China's Belt and Road Initiative specifically aims to promote Chinese technology standards in partner countries. More broadly, China has in recent years increased its presence in standardization processes and secured more technical leadership positions in key standards development organizations (SDOs).
Why are standards important?
International technology standards are still developed largely through cooperation between private companies or representatives of national standards. There are an incredible number of standards development organizations whose role is to agree on technology-specific standards such as common technical designs, procedures, and principles that allow interoperability of different technologies or that define minimum levels of safety or reliability. For example, today Wi-Fi is the worldwide standard for wireless LANs. Thanks to agreed international standards, consumers can easily connect their devices to wireless routers regardless of the brand or their location in the world. Standards thus facilitate technological progress, economies of scale, and international trade.
Importantly, companies or countries that succeed in formulating technology standards are often well positioned to shape entire technology ecosystems. In general, standards are most important in technologies that provide platforms or form a central element in such ecosystems, where interoperability is key. The Internet is a good example of technology of this type.
The normative, ethical and security dimensions of standards are also of central importance. In this respect, technologies that are closer to the application level – and that people use directly – tend to have the most direct normative influence. Standards of fairness or trustworthiness in AI systems are a vivid and well-known example where normative and ethical dimensions loom large. With regard to security, the same standards define the security of technology – such as the level of cybersecurity of 5G communications or smart city technologies – and reflect and contribute to economic power and thus the potential development of strategic dependencies. This, in turn, could pose a risk to economic security, such as Europe's dependence on China for rare earth elements or lithium batteries – areas where China is also seeking to expand its standardization influence.
China and international standards
To be sure, given the significant power generated by leadership in technology standards, closer scrutiny of China's involvement is warranted. The growing role played by the state in developing standards is often a natural consequence of its technological renaissance, as new technical standards tend to be shaped by technological leaders. However, Western observers express concern about China undermining established international norm development processes to advance its authoritarian technologies and values. They include behaviors related to efforts to reshape the global Internet into something more amenable to authoritarian regimes. China has not only attempted to export its “Great Firewall” approach, but has also attempted to change global Internet governance, standards, and protocols in order to facilitate greater state control. There have also been instances of coordinated voting to advance Chinese standards.
But these are more exceptions than the rule. So far, China has largely stuck to the rules: like their Western counterparts, Chinese contributors to standards make proposals they find useful and defend them in the complex, consensus-seeking negotiations that characterize standards development. Simply put, over the years China has become a leader in many key technologies and is now well positioned to participate in shaping international technology standards thanks to the technical merit and economic strength of Chinese companies. China is already gaining greater profile and securing more leadership positions in standard setting organizations; But the West still dominates the development of international standards. However, the governance structures of most standard-setting organizations and the nature of technical standards—standards that are only widely adopted if they provide real economic or technical benefits to a large number of companies and users internationally—prevent the global diffusion of politically motivated technical standards. Or as a result of manipulated standards development processes.
What should the European Union do?
However, EU policymakers should closely and continuously monitor China's increasing role in leading branding working groups and standards contributions in technologies and areas critical to the EU – including rare earth elements and lithium batteries, but also artificial intelligence and generation. Fifth. They must do so to ensure that emerging standards are based on technical merit, represent the result of fair, transparent and consensus-based processes, and pose no risk to fundamental rights or security.
It is crucial that, rather than explicitly opposing adherence to Chinese standards – and thus risking fragmentation of the international standardization system – European policymakers closely examine standardization processes in critical technology areas and management dynamics in key standardization organizations. Policymakers must then find a fine balance between addressing the challenges caused by China's strategic, aggressive and sometimes manipulative engagement, and not over-politicizing – or over-politicizing – the development of international norms, which still work mostly to the benefit of Western economies and Western countries. world Trade.
This will not be an easy task. Such scrutiny is an extremely complex endeavor because of the sheer number of standard-setting organizations – there are several hundred of them, along with many working groups within standard-setting organizations dedicated to specific technologies (the International Organization for Standardization, ISO, alone has more than 250 technical committees). Their governance structures and standards development processes are diverse and complex, and are generally led by private sector representatives or technical experts with no or limited government presence.
A platform for constant vigilance
Any such ongoing monitoring must therefore set clear priorities and effectively collect and integrate information about specific and structural dynamics in the development of international standards. The proposals in the EU's 2022 standardization strategy – which was also a response to China's growing influence in standards development – are either insufficient or have not yet been achieved. The High-Level Forum began its work in 2023, but its primary focus is within the EU and it lacks civil society and (foreign) policy expertise. The standardization strategy proposes a mechanism for Member States and national standardization bodies to exchange information and monitor international standardization, but it similarly lacks broader participation. Importantly, none of these initiatives appear to be using digital tools to collect comprehensive data.
To address this problem, the EU should create a permanent platform that combines broad stakeholder engagement (including private sector professionals, civil society, academia, technical and policy experts) with digital solutions that continuously mine available international standardization data. This platform should prioritize which standardization activities it primarily monitors and evaluates. It is clear that the European Union should pay particular attention to technologies that it considers critical, such as those that are crucial to the green and digital transitions. The list of critical technologies mentioned in the European Commission's Economic Security Strategy could be a starting point.
However, technical standards are not equally important or influential in all technologies. Therefore, the European Union must also devise an analytical framework to determine the importance of different criteria in the priority setting process. This should take into account three main dimensions that determine the geopolitical power of technology standards: economic impact, security impact, and normative impact.
Having identified key technologies and standardization processes, such a platform should then aim to combine information retrieved from (European) stakeholders involved in these standardization activities with expert analyzes of larger policy dynamics. Data analysis tools should complement this work. While not all standard setting organizations meet self-declared standards for transparent operations, many do, and so some data is available. These analysis tools can collect this data and thus track the emergence of new standardization activities or working groups, changes in the leadership of standard setting organizations and working groups, and important contributions to the field of standardization.
By leveraging insights gained from the ongoing engagement of key stakeholders and the data collected, the EU will be better placed to implement concrete measures to ensure that the development of international standards does not fall victim to political manipulation by China – or to geopolitical overreaction by the West. To China's rise in technology standardization.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications represent solely the opinions of their individual authors.