In the case of spirit Focusing on the far right, Nicolas Massol traces the development of the National Rally (RN) over the past decade. He wonders: What is the National Front party now? Is it an extreme right-wing party that hides its true nature, or is it a mixture of nationalism, extreme right-wing thought, populism, pragmatism, demagoguery, and even some elements of progressivism?
In 2013, the racist nationalist writer Dominique Fenner framed his suicide as a necessary act to shake the French out of their slumber and fight the “Great Replacement.” When Marine Le Pen tweeted her admiration for her, no one was surprised. But the decade that followed has witnessed a radical shift: the party now rejects any affiliation with far-right figures, keeps those with links to violence or extremism out of the spotlight, and gives stardom to new recruits from traditional parties.
The National Front has used demonization as a strategy for decades, exploiting its position as an outsider. But the National Front (renamed in 2018) now favors a theater of (partial) demonization, where Le Pen now plays “opposite Eric Zemmour.” With 88 deputies in the National Assembly since 2022, the National Rally's new goal is integration. His political strategy is “constructive.” Since 2022, it has only presented consensus-building proposals, none of which relate to immigration or immigration.“national preference” Although this principle of giving French citizens priority in jobs, social assistance, and housing remains the policy of the National Front.
But despite the repositioning, far-right networks remain intertwined and essential to the party. One example is e-Politic, the RN communications provider and feeder organization for the party. The Republican Party keeps him at bay because of the extreme policies of its shareholders, but can't cut ties with him. Thus, the past decade has been characterized by incoherence: “Having become mired in a far-right ideology that they are no longer allowed to espouse openly, National Front activists now belong to a party with no real shared culture.”
Back to the 1930s
Adam Levrier challenges the euphemistic description of contemporary far-right media in France as “pluralistic spaces…that respect all opinions.” He sees this as a denial of the continuity of the “nationalist, xenophobic journalistic tradition” that began in the Belle Era and flourished until the end of World War II.
Livrier studies far-right media in France, focusing on the empire of businessman Vincent Bolloré, which includes C News, and since earlier this year Sunday newspaper (JDD), now with far-right journalist Geoffroy Lejeune at its helm. Like the historical far-right press, these media see themselves as defending “a France under threat… corrupted by the presence of the enemy within.” The “non-assimilable foreigner” also continues to be scapegoated, with news channels constantly repeating their “accusations against Muslims and communities of foreign origin.”
In the Dinar, Lejeune infuses each case with his “identity obsessions.” In a repeat of the “linguistic excesses” of the 1920s and 1930s, today’s far-right press calls into question democratic institutions, portraying them as “corrupt elites, subject to foreign influence, and incapable of defending the national interest.” An argumentative style and “propensity for conflict and anger” became his trademark, with C News guests from the center and left being attacked in an “almost ritualistic manner.” However, despite this tone of violence, these programs deny the influence of any “far-right” ideology.
But this may not be the case for much longer. Eric Zemmour, a major figure at C News, has made no secret of his fascination with historical far-right figures. His “radicalism and candor” won him supporters and made him “a pioneer and a model for a generation of journalists who today burn with a desire to follow his example.” The new team is in DinarSome of them are particularly affiliated with the far right, and they are indebted to Zemmour for bringing long-hated rhetoric out of the cold.
Charm
The far right is on the rise in Europe – but are these parties and their supporters fascists? It is a futile debate, says Pierre Zaoui. More useful is the recognition of the “fascination” that has been at work in European societies and beyond since the 1980s. This process, like “racism”—“a social process that constructs otherness”—works through “language and bodies.” [and] flows,” and Zawi offers “practical lessons” for stemming this tide.
In a society undergoing fascism, language becomes “impersonal and semi-autonomous.” At first, it is “gossip and incomplete,” but as it spreads through our social spaces, fueled by the media, rumors and the rhetoric of powerful businessmen, it takes shape. Ultimately, the “terrible fascist language” emerges. This distinguishes between “friends and enemies, us and them, here and there,” and by “use.” ad nauseam The “vocabularies of genocide” legitimize violence against others.
The connotations of this violence, as much as the act itself, produces physical arousal. This is often a secret, Enjoy In annihilating the vulnerable flows through our societies, “across all social bodies”, that touch everyone. To avoid drowning, we must build barriers: electoral, when we have the right to vote; Linguist when we reject the lexicon of extermination; and physical barriers to defeating fascists “in the street, on football fields, or in Ukraine.”
Unlike the anti-fascist struggle, which involves weapons and is a fight to the death, the anti-fascist struggle is “more formative and less violent.” It requires each person to eradicate it from himself at the same time as he opposes it in others.
Published in collaboration with CAIRN International Edition, translated and edited by Cadenza Academic Translations.
