The first month of 2024 has already witnessed three elections in Asian countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan and Taiwan. February will see elections in at least two other Asian countries – Pakistan and Indonesia. In all of these countries, the effects of great power competition—between the United States and China—were important issues to consider. Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest democracy, is scheduled to go to the polls on February 14. These elections are unique and will have an impact on geopolitics given the role China plays in international politics, which in turn affects national politics.
In Indonesia, the presidential election is a three-way race between Prabowo Subianto, a former special forces commander and two-time opponent of incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo turned defense minister. Jangar Pranowo – former Governor of Central Java and Anies Baswedan – former Governor of Jakarta. Joko Widodo, the current very popular president, cannot run in the elections as his second and final term ends this year. Jokowi has shown his support for Prabowo Subianto and Jokowi's eldest son Gibran Rakabuming Raka is Subianto's deputy.
The winner of the presidential election will shape the foreign policy choices of more than 270 million Indonesians. To understand what directions Indonesian foreign policy might take under any of the three contenders, it is relevant to understand Indonesia's current foreign policy outlook under Jokowi. Since taking office in 2014, Jokowi has put forward a foreign policy centered around the domestic economy first, to develop Indonesia into one of the world's five largest economies by 2045. In 2022, with a nominal GDP of $1.3 trillion, Indonesia ranked sixth. ten.
To support the Indonesian economy, Jokowi strengthened economic diplomacy and consolidated Indonesia's position as a commodity giant by moving production inland and initiated large infrastructure projects, of which the plan to build Nusantra as the capital of Indonesia is one of the most important. Noteworthy examples of Indonesia's leadership in geopolitics include its presidency of the G20 in 2022 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2023.
In 2023, the long-awaited, Chinese-backed high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung began operation, and the flight of its first bullet train in October was hailed as the conclusion to the fraught process of building high-speed railways in Indonesia. China provided financial support for the project through its political banks and state-owned companies. Construction began in 2016 with a massive budget that started with $4.5 billion, in the form of concessional financing through joint projects between Indonesia and China. The project continued to work overtime for various reasons including coronavirus and other logistical delays. The project took extra time and was $1.2 billion over budget. To cover this overreach, China wanted Indonesia to provide the state budget as guarantee. Big questions have arisen about China's debt-trap diplomacy in Indonesia. However, Indonesia has steadfastly stuck to its position and has not offered the state budget as a guarantee that might have implications for its sovereignty. However, questions remain about the pressure imposed on Indonesia to repay the huge loan, as China pays a repayment rate of 3.4%, while Indonesia insists on a much lower repayment rate of 2%.
Against this backdrop, the three contenders will head to the polls on February 14. The election promises made by each of the three candidates are also worth analyzing to understand the plausible direction Indonesia might take after the elections.
Subianto Prabowo, who comes from an elite family and enjoys significant support, has promised to continue Jokowi's program to build Nusantra as a new capital. He also promised to develop the maritime sector and announced his intention to raise the ratio of state revenues to GDP to 23% with the establishment of the State Revenue Agency. He plans to gradually increase the defense budget and modernize the army. He also promised to achieve food, energy and water security. He represents the Greater Indonesia Movement (Girindra) party.
His rival, Janjar Pranowo of the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, enjoys massive support from ordinary Indonesians because he is not part of any political or military elite and comes from a humble background. Mahfud MD, Indonesia's widely respected Coordinating Minister for Security Affairs, is Genjar's deputy. Kanjar is also very popular among young voters and is active on social media. Jangar also stated that he would continue President Widodo's programs, and he maintained a target growth rate of 7% for the Indonesian economy and promised to create 17 million jobs. He also promised to modernize military equipment, along with expanding social welfare coverage.
The third competitor, academic Anis Baswedan, is a very popular figure. He does not belong to any political party but enjoys the support of three. He announced a target growth rate of 5.5% to 6.5% in Indonesia, creating 15 million jobs, and raising the tax-to-GDP ratio from 10.4% in 2022 to 13% to 16% by 2029. He also promised to keep the inflation rate steady. Between 2-3%, with two million new affordable units created.
As is clear from the statements of the three candidates, the development of the local economy will continue. For this reason, China may be viewed favorably if other donor countries do not make offers to fill this gap. Indonesia's experience with the debt it already holds should make it cautious about further such arrangements with China. However, given the fact that infrastructure is a need pointed out by the three candidates, China will try to take advantage of the infrastructure gap and will make more lucrative offers. At least two candidates have promised to upgrade the military, meaning that sovereignty, especially in the South China Sea, will be an ongoing foreign policy concern. The archipelagic state and its election results have major implications for great power competition in Asia and need to be closely monitored.
This article was written by Sriparna Pathak, Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
