jack watling, Weapons of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century (Bloomsbury, from the Royal United Services Institute, 2023)
There is an ongoing debate in the American military establishment about the changing character of warfare. Officially, we acknowledge the need for major change regarding continuity, but very few people agree on the details. Ongoing conflicts raise questions. In particular, how will the rapid deployment of low-cost unmanned systems and a range of precision and lethal strike munitions impact the war and US defense priorities? How should tomorrow's ground forces adapt to the allegedly changing nature of warfare? What is legacy capability now and what are the new priorities shaping US military investments? new book, Weapons of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century, gets to the heart of this debate, takes a progressive look at these questions and urges adaptation. It is racing to what a previous article in these pages called “the inflection point between evolutionary adaptation and revolutionary adaptation.”
The author's thesis is clear: although there is more than enough evidence pointing to the need to change the way armies fight, they are not properly modernizing or restructuring their forces. Rather than transforming power coherently, “militaries today largely seek to retain tried and tested structures while adding new capabilities to their platforms.” The author asserts that integrating new capabilities into existing platforms is inefficient and adds costs.
The author of this informative, often provocative book is a Senior Research Fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute. Jack Watling is widely recognized as an international expert on ground warfare and has received accolades for a series of consistently in-depth studies and commentary on the ongoing war in Ukraine. His latest product is not just an academic exercise; It is based on extensive interviews, empirical reports, direct observation, and interviews from contemporary exercises and wars.
Watling's design builds from the bottom up, tracking logically from tasks to structure. His ideas were already beginning to influence European military thinking, especially in how the British Army intended to fight, i.e. more dispersed and more lethal as well. They fully deserve the serious attention of the U.S. defense establishment as we adjust U.S. defense priorities after Ukraine. It will require innovative thinking, creative applications of tactics and techniques, and advanced training to address the action/counter-response dynamics inherent in warfare.
The book contains two main sections. The first presents the author's vision of the future business environment. In five concise chapters, Watling explains the transparency of the battlefield, the contested electromagnetic spectrum, the limitations of protection amid a high kill rate, the complexity of combat support, and the ever-present reality of urban operations. There is no significant discrepancy with the US Army's projected operational environment except for TRADOC's forecast on climate change.
In the chapter on protection and enhancing lethality, Watling's judgments about trends and trade-offs in mobility, firepower and armor protection were notable and were an important theme in revitalizing his force design. He argues against slow and evolutionary change:
Today the improvements in killing ability are greatly improved. In contrast, improvements in protection have begun to advance logarithmically, with smaller gains requiring ever greater resources to achieve. This has far-reaching consequences for how armies think and design their combat systems.
The best chapter deals with the age-old problems associated with urban warfare. While the advantages offered by Western militaries are often negated in urban settings, there are options and opportunities for success in urban battles as shown in detailed studies of the operations directed by the United States against ISIS in Mosul in 2014. Watling draws on insights from contemporaries Others conflicts in Narakano-Karabakh, Iraq and Ukraine. The ongoing battle for Gaza may add a new chapter and force us to remember old but overlooked lessons about fighting in cities. The author clearly believes that control of urban nodes is crucial.
The second part of Future weapons Dedicated to exploring the implications of the expected security environment for force design. Dr. Watling devotes separate chapters to each component of the modern combined weapons system. Its mission organization is illustrative but not prescriptive. Watling offers a force design that is inherently integrated and mutually supported with four subsystems. The first is Maneuvering system, which the author assigns to reconnaissance, examination, and counter-reconnaissance. The battle group proposed to be examined consists of four companies—support (including headquarters), reconnaissance, mechanized infantry, and light cavalry. The second is Fire systemIt consists of four components – command and control, target acquisition, lethal fire, and non-lethal fire. For fires, Watling develops a three-tier formation: long-range rocket artillery, cannon, and loitering munitions. The third is Assault system. Watling envisions his design for this component on the basis of an urban assault battalion comprising three armored assault companies, an engineering company, and an autonomous robotic systems company. Each assault platoon includes six vehicles – two tanks with smoothbore guns (fifty-four tons or less) and active protection for kinetic vertical attack and four vehicles with 30 to 60 mm guns for suppression and countering unmanned aerial systems. Finally, there it is Support system. This includes command and control, mobile combat support elements, force/post protection assets, electronic warfare and information operations resources.
At first glance, the lack of a command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system seemed alarming. However, the author argues that leadership is an enabling function and is more related to ensuring alignment, sustainability and coordination. Here the author adopts some ideas from Exeter Professor Anthony King, who has argued on this matter Leadership: The 21st Century General For less directive leadership models and for more distributed and participatory decision making. Future weapons Reinforces King's argument that leadership must evolve with changes in the nature of conflict. This topic is debated and should be developed further.
The US joint combat community is searching for answers to many of the questions that have been raised Future weapons. In particular, US Army Futures Command and Marine Corps Force Design grapple with the promise of disruptive technologies and the trade-offs involved in designing future ground combat capabilities. Army leaders are seeking more transformational efforts than mere modernization. Separating fact from fiction relies on clear, observable results, whether through experimentation or sustained combat operations, and this is one of the strengths of Watling's approach.
Future weapons It presents a number of conclusions regarding maneuverability, armored vehicles and unmanned systems. Regarding maneuvering, the author rejects the “maneuvering is dead” school, but still appreciates the appropriate role of materiel attrition for future success. Watling argues in favor of a modern, fit-for-purpose combined weapons system rather than a heavier package of cool, cool technological wizardry being integrated into existing organizational structures and practices. There is still a clear need for offensive maneuver, said Professor Stephen Biddle, but the ability to maneuver successfully will require rethinking. In this perpetual competition to adapt to warfare, the combined weapons system must continue to evolve. Watling's detailed ideas about formations and capabilities are valuable contributions to the debate about the contours of this development.
As for the shield Future weapons It is relevant to the ongoing debate about the future of the tank. Watling recognizes that there is a continued role for mobile and protected lethality on the battlefields of the future. He agrees that the tank is not dead but appreciates the need to adapt its use in war. Watling's arguments are consistent with respected Israeli scholar Azar Gat, who has advocated combat vehicles weighing up to thirty tons, with an emphasis on active protection systems rather than heavy armor and attendant logistical requirements. The US military's search for lighter, hybrid, and highly automated armored vehicles is an appropriate goal, but we must avoid illusions about purely technological solutions. Successful maneuvering will require the ability to demonstrate ambiguity, deception, and disinformation across domains. Watling concludes: “The protection provided by armor may be illusory, but by shedding the illusions armies can regain their ability to survive.”
The Watling force design also addresses the increasing role of drones and unmanned aerial systems within a more comprehensive combined arms concept. This contradicts former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, a specialist Pentagon consultant, who visited Ukraine and concluded that the future of warfare “will be dictated and conducted by drones” alone. Watling is keenly aware that drones and artificial intelligence are being employed to great operational effect in ongoing conflicts. However, there is more to war than just strikes, and the author presents ideas for exploiting unmanned platforms, as well as addressing their use against US forces.
This is a thoroughly researched product that makes evidence-based judgments about future power design at the micro level. It is a timely exploration of continuing changes in the nature of war and draws on ongoing trends and judicious extrapolations. Policymakers and military service force developers can draw many insights from Watling's painstaking research. Proposals in Future weapons It is highly relevant to US defense requirements, at least with respect to conventional warfare. The non-traditional requirements and special operations community won't find much to delve into. Readers may object to some of the conclusions, but they cannot doubt that the author has asked the right questions and provided workable solutions. Today there is a need for objective and urgent testing of concepts and capabilities. A good place to start is with the observations and insightful ideas contained in this book.
Dr. Frank Hoffman is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He is a former Marine.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo credit: Savannah Baldwin, US Army